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How should monetary policy respond to changes in financial conditions? In this paper 
we consider a simple model where firms are subject to idiosyncratic shocks which 
may force them to default on their debt. Firms’ assets and liabilities are denominated 
in nominal terms and predetermined when shocks occur. Monetary policy can 
therefore affect the real value of funds used to finance production. Furthermore, 
policy affects the loan and deposit rates. In our model, allowing for short-term 
inflation volatility in response to exogenous shocks can be optimal; the optimal 
response to adverse financial shocks is to lower interest rates, if not at the zero bound, 
and to engineer a short period of controlled inflation; the Taylor rule may implement 
allocations that have opposite cyclical properties to the optimal ones. 
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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
How should monetary policy respond to ￿nancial shocks? How should it re-
spond to real shocks, when ￿nancial conditions a⁄ect macroeconomic outcomes?
Would a short-term deviation from price stability help the economic recovery
after recessions induced by ￿nancial shocks? How relevant is the zero bound
constraint on the nominal interest rate?
This paper tries to shed light on these questions based on a model where
monetary policy has the ability to a⁄ect the ￿nancing conditions of ￿rms. To an-
alyze this particular channel of transmission of monetary policy, the paper relies
on a simpli￿ed framework, which abstracts from other transmission channels.
Our set-up has three distinguishing features. First, ￿rms￿internal and exter-
nal sources of ￿nance are imperfect substitutes. This is due to the presence of
information asymmetries, such that banks cannot observe ￿rms￿productivity
without exercising a costly monitoring activity. Second, both ￿rms￿internal
funds and the loans they receive from banks are denominated in nominal terms
￿hence a⁄ected by in￿ ation. Third, the quantity of bank loans and the in-
terest rate on those loans are predetermined and cannot be adjusted after the
occurrence of aggregate shocks.
In this environment, allowing for short-term in￿ ation volatility in response
to exogenous shocks can be optimal. In response to technology shocks, for
example, changes in the price level can facilitate the necessary adjustment in
the real value of ￿rms￿internal and external funds. If the shock is negative and
persistent, a very short-lived in￿ ationary episode would be su¢ cient to ensure
the most e¢ cient economic outcome. Along the adjustment path, the policy
interest rate, credit spreads, ￿nancial markups, leverage, and bankruptcy rates
would be completely stabilized.
The optimal response to an adverse ￿nancial shock ￿namely a shock that
reduces ￿rms￿internal funds and increases ￿rms￿leverage ￿ also warrants a
short-lived increase in in￿ ation. The increase in in￿ ation mitigates the adverse
consequences of the shock on bankruptcy rates and allows ￿rms to de-leverage
more quickly.
In the baseline version of our model, the optimal deposit rate is zero, cor-
responding to the Friedman rule. When the nominal interest rate is not at the
lower bound and can be adjusted in response to shocks, it should be lowered
after adverse ￿nancial shocks. Reducing the nominal interest rate allows policy
to speed up the adjustment process and to mitigate the consequences of these
shocks on output. For instance, a shock that reduces the value of internal funds
is persistently contractionary when the short term nominal rate is at zero, while
it is less contractionary and produces very short-lived e⁄ects on output when
the short term rate can be reduced.
Compared to these optimal policy responses, following a simple Taylor-type
rule can be costly, in the sense of inducing persistent deviations in real variables
from their optimal values and more volatile bankruptcy rates. In response to
technology shocks, bankruptcies are countercyclical when policy follows a Taylor
rule, while they are acyclical under optimal policy. In response to a ￿nancial6
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1 Introduction
During ￿nancial crises, credit conditions tend to worsen for all agents in the economy. In the
press, there are frequent calls for a looser monetary policy stance, on the grounds that this
helps avoid a deep recession and the risks of a credit crunch. The intuitive argument is that
lower interest rates tend to make it easier for ￿rms to obtain external ￿nance, thus countering
the e⁄ects of the tightening of credit standards. Arguments tracing back to Fisher (1933)
can also be used to call for some degree of in￿ ation during ￿nancial crises, so as to avoid an
excessive increase in ￿rms￿leverage through a devaluation of their nominal liabilities.
It is less clear, however, whether these arguments would withstand a more formal analysis.
In this paper, we present a model that can be used to evaluate them. More speci￿cally, we
address the following questions: How should monetary policy respond to ￿nancial shocks? How
should it respond to other shocks, when ￿nancial conditions a⁄ect macroeconomic outcomes?
Should monetary policy engineer some in￿ ation during recessions? How relevant is the zero
bound on the nominal interest rate?
To answer these questions, we use a model where monetary policy has the ability to a⁄ect
the ￿nancing conditions of ￿rms. Our set-up has three distinguishing features. First, ￿rms￿
internal and external funds are imperfect substitutes. This is due to the presence of infor-
mation asymmetries between ￿rms and banks regarding ￿rms￿productivity, and to the fact
that monitoring is a costly activity for banks. Second, ￿rms￿internal and external funds are
nominal assets. Third, those funds, both internal and external, as well as the interest rate on
bank loans, are predetermined when aggregate shocks occur.
We ￿nd that, for the Ramsey planner, allowing for short-term in￿ ation volatility in response
to exogenous shocks can be optimal. In response to technology shocks, for example, the price
level should move to adjust the real value of total funds. If the shock is negative, the price level
increases on impact to lower real funds as well as the real wage. Subsequently, the price level
falls in order to increase the real wage at the same pace as productivity, in the convergence
back to the steady state. Along the adjustment path, deposit and loan rates, spreads, ￿nancial
markups, leverage, and bankruptcy rates remain stable. Therefore, under the optimal policy,
and if technology shocks were the only shocks hitting the economy, bankruptcies would be
acyclical.8
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The optimal response to a ￿nancial shock that reduces ￿rms￿internal funds, increasing
￿rms￿leverage, also involves an increase in the price level on impact, in order to lower real funds
and the real wage. The short period of controlled in￿ ation mitigates the adverse consequences
of the shock on bankruptcy rates and allows ￿rms to de-leverage more quickly.
In the baseline version of our model, the optimal deposit rate is zero, corresponding to the
Friedman rule. Because assets are nominal and predetermined, a set path for the nominal in-
terest rate does not pin down equilibrium allocations. Policy can additionally a⁄ect allocations
through ex-post volatility of the price level.
To analyze the optimal interest rate reaction to shocks, we introduce government con-
sumption as an exogenous share of production. This assumption generates a rationale for
proportionate taxation. The nominal interest rate acts as a tax on consumption and there-
fore the optimal steady-state interest rate becomes positive ￿the Friedman rule is no longer
optimal.
When the optimal average interest rate is away from the lower bound, it may be optimal for
the interest rate to respond to shocks. This is indeed the case for ￿nancial shocks, but not for
technology shocks. In response to technology shocks, it is optimal to keep rates constant even
if they could be lowered. For ￿nancial shocks, the ￿ exibility of moving the nominal interest
rate downwards allows policy to speed up the adjustment process. Moreover, the e⁄ect of
these shocks on output can be considerably mitigated. For instance, a shock that reduces the
availability of internal funds is persistently contractionary when the short term nominal rate
is kept ￿xed at zero, while it is less contractionary and has very short-lived e⁄ects on output
when the average interest rate is away from the lower bound and the short term nominal rate
is reduced.
Compared to the optimal Ramsey plan, a policy response according to a simple Taylor-
type rule can be costly, in the sense of inducing more persistent deviations in real variables
from their optimal values and higher bankruptcy rates. In response to technology shocks,
bankruptcies become countercyclical under the simple rule. In response to a ￿nancial shock
that reduces internal funds, there is de￿ ation initially, which increases the real value of total
funds and leads to a much larger increase in leverage. The reduction in output is smaller than
under the optimal policy and markups decrease, inducing higher bankruptcy rates.
In order to understand the mechanisms responsible for these results, we analyze a simpli￿ed
model in which internal and external funds are perfect substitutes (i.e. monitoring costs are9
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zero). We use this model to illustrate that the two assumptions of nominal denomination and
predetermination of the funds used to ￿nance production are su¢ cient conditions for changes
in the price level to a⁄ect allocations. For this speci￿c case, we show that, in response to a
technology shock, optimal monetary policy aims at keeping the nominal wage constant. This
is achieved by inducing movements in the price level such that the real wage adjusts one-
to-one to productivity. Because, under log-linear preferences, labor does not move, nominal
predetermined funds are ex-post optimal.
This simpli￿ed case also highlights two advantages of the more general model with asym-
metric information and monitoring costs. The ￿rst one is to allow for policy analysis in response
to ￿nancial shocks. Financial shocks are indeed hard to think of in the simple environment in
which internal and external funds are perfect substitutes. The second advantage of the model
with asymmetric information and monitoring costs is to amplify the reaction of the economy
to shocks, when monetary policy follows a simple rule.
This paper contributes to the literature that analyzes the e⁄ects of ￿nancial factors on the
transmission of shocks. Financial factors play a role because of agency costs, as in Bernanke
et al. (1999) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997, 1998, 2001). In Bernanke et al. (1999), agency
costs are added to an otherwise standard New-Keynesian model, where monetary policy has
real e⁄ects because of the presence of sticky prices. In Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001), prices are
￿ exible but money a⁄ects real activity because of a cash-in-advance constraint on households￿
purchases. In our model, prices are ￿ exible but monetary policy has real e⁄ects because ￿rms
must use funds to pay wages and these funds are nominal and predetermined.
Our work is most closely related to a recent literature that analyzes optimal monetary
policy in models with ￿nancial frictions (see e.g. Ravenna and Walsh (2006), Curdia and
Woodford (2008), De Fiore and Tristani (2008), Carlstrom et al. (2009), and Faia (2009)).1
Ravenna and Walsh (2006) characterize optimal monetary policy when ￿rms need to borrow
to ￿nance production, but there is no default risk and the cost of ￿nancing is the risk-free
rate. Curdia and Woodford (2008) consider a model where ￿nancial frictions matter for the
allocation of resources, because of the heterogeneity in households￿spending opportunities. In
their setup, credit spreads arise because loans are costly to produce, but they are linked to
macroeconomic conditions through a ￿ exible reduced-form function. Instead, credit spreads
emerge as the outcome of an optimal ￿nancial contract in De Fiore and Tristani (2008) and
1See also Christiano et al. (2003).10
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Faia (2009), while Carlstrom et al. (2009) model agency costs as a constraint on the ￿rm￿ s
hiring of labor. In all these papers, prices are assumed to be sticky. The main lesson from
this literature is that, in the presence of ￿nancial frictions, both ￿nancial and non-￿nancial
shocks create a trade-o⁄between in￿ ation and output gap stabilization. Although perfect price
stability is in general not optimal, under reasonable calibrations, the welfare gains associated
to price stability are much larger than those associated to mitigating the ￿nancial distortions.
The main distinguishing feature between these models and ours is the assumption that
￿rms￿￿nancing conditions are predetermined when aggregate shocks occur. In our model, the
stock of internal funds, the amount of banks loans, and the interest rate on bank loans are not
contingent on the realization of aggregate shocks. This enables us to study how changes in the
in￿ ation rate may have an impact on the dynamics of ￿rms￿leverage. To study this particular
channel of transmission of monetary policy, we abstract from other frictions, such as sticky
prices.
Building upon the Bernanke et al. (1999) setup, Gilchrist and Leahy (2002) and Faia and
Monacelli (2007) ￿nd that the presence of ￿nancial frictions does not provide a justi￿cation
for reacting to asset prices directly. In reaction to a technology shock and to an expected
technology shock, monetary policy should react to asset prices, but a policy that reacts strongly
to in￿ ation closely approximates the optimal policy. In our model, a policy that stabilizes prices
performs slightly better than a simple Taylor rule that does not react aggressively to in￿ ation.
For the reasons discussed above, however, an aggressive policy response to in￿ ation remains
largely sub-optimal in our model.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we outline the environment and describe the
equilibria. Then, we derive implementability conditions and we characterize optimal monetary
policy. In section 3, we provide numerical results on the response of the economy to various
shocks. We compare the case where optimal interest rate policy is the Friedman rule to the
case where, because government consumption is assumed to be a ￿xed share of output, the
optimal average interest rate is away from zero. We describe results both under the optimal
monetary policy and a sub-optimal (Taylor) rule. In section 4, we analyze a simple model in
which internal and external funds are perfect substitutes, and use it to provide some intuition
on the results obtained for the general model. In section 5, we conclude.11
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2 Model
We consider a model where ￿rms need internal and external funds to produce and they fail if
they are not able to repay their debts. Both internal funds and ￿rm debt are nominal assets.
There is a goods market at the beginning of the period and an assets market at the end,2
where funds are decided for the following period. Funds are predetermined.
Production uses labor only with a linear technology. Aggregate productivity is stochastic.
In addition, each ￿rm faces an idiosyncratic shock whose realization is private information.
The households have preferences over consumption, labor and real money. For convenience
we assume separability for the utility in real balances.3
Banks are ￿nancial intermediaries. They are zero pro￿t, zero risk operations. Banks take
deposits from households and allocate them to entrepreneurs on the basis of a debt contract
where the entrepreneurs repay their debts if production is su¢ cient and default otherwise,
handing in total production to the banks, provided these pay the monitoring costs. Because
there is aggregate uncertainty, we assume that the government can make lump sum transfers
between the households and the banks that ensure that banks have zero pro￿ts in every state.4
This way the banks are able to pay a risk free rate on deposits.
Entrepreneurs need to borrow in advance to ￿nance production. The payments on out-
standing debt are not state dependent. Entrepreneurs are risk neutral, patient, agents, that
die with some probability. Their assets are seized at the time of death. In equilibrium they
postpone consumption inde￿nitely. The tax on their assets at the time of death ensures that
there is always a need for external funds.
The banks are owned, but not controlled,5 by the entrepreneurs. They behave as risk
neutral agents, which is convenient since the ￿nancial contract is then between two risk neutral
agents.
2This is the timing of transactions in Svensson (1985).
3We also assume a negligible contribution of real balances to welfare. This does not mean that the economy
is cashless since ￿rms face a cash-in-advance constraint.
4We assume that the monitoring activities of banks can be observed, in order to keep the incentives to
monitor una⁄ected by the insurance scheme. This amounts to assuming that bank supervision can be exercized
at zero cost.
5Each entrepreneur owns an arbitrarily small share of each bank.12
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Monetary policy can a⁄ect the real value of total funds available for the production of ￿rms,
but it can also a⁄ect the real value of debt that needs to be repaid. Furthermore, monetary
policy also a⁄ects the deposit and loan rates.
2.1 Households
At the end of period t in the assets market, households decide on holdings of money Mt that
they will be able to use at the beginning of period t+1 in the goods market, and on one-period
deposits denominated in units of currency Dt that will pay Rd
tDt in the assets market in period
t+1. Deposits are riskless, in the sense that banks do not fail. The households also decide on
a portfolio of nominal state-contingent bonds, each paying a unit of currency in a particular
state in period t + 1. The state-contingent bonds cost EtQt;t+1St+1, where Qt;t+1 is the price
in units of money at t of each bond normalized by the conditional probability of occurrence of
the state at t + 1.
The budget constraint at period t is
Mt + EtQt;t+1St+1 + Dt ￿ St + Rd
t￿1Dt￿1 + Mt￿1 ￿ Ptct + Wtnt ￿ Th
t ; (1)
where ct is the amount of the ￿nal consumption good purchased, Pt is its price, nt is hours
worked, Wt is the nominal wage, and Th
t are lump-sum nominal taxes collected by the govern-
ment.





￿t [u(ct;mt) ￿ ￿nt]
)
; (2)
subject to (1) and a no-Ponzi games condition. Here uc > 0; um ￿ 0; ucc < 0;umm < 0, ￿ > 0
and mt ￿ Mt￿1=Pt denotes real balances. Throughout we will assume that the utility function
is separable in real money, mt, and that the contribution of money to welfare is negligible.






















um (t + 1)
Pt+1
= Et
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2.2 Production
The production sector is composed of a continuum of ￿rms, indexed by i 2 [0;1]. Each ￿rm is
endowed with a stochastic technology that transforms Ni;t units of labor into !i;tAtNi;t units
of output. The random variable !i;t is i.i.d. across time and across ￿rms, with distribution
￿, density ￿, mean 1 and standard deviation ￿!i;t. At is an AR (1) aggregate productivity
shock. The shock !i;t is private information, but its realization can be observed by the ￿nancial
intermediary at the cost of a share ￿ of the ￿rm￿ s output.
The ￿rms decide in the assets market at t￿1 the amount of internal funds to be available in
period t, Zi;t￿1. Lending occurs through the ￿nancial intermediary. The existence of aggregate
shocks occurring during the duration of the contract implies that the intermediary￿ s return from
the lending activity is not safe, regardless of its ability to di⁄erentiate across the continuum
of ￿rms facing i.i.d. shocks. We assume the existence of a deposit insurance scheme that the
government implements by completely taxing away the intermediary￿ s pro￿ts whenever the
aggregate shock is relatively high, and by providing subsidies up to the point where pro￿ts are
zero when the aggregate shock is relatively low. Such scheme is ￿nanced with lump-sum taxes
and transfers to the household. It guarantees that the intermediary is always able to repay the
safe return to the household, thus insuring households￿deposits from aggregate risk.
2.2.1 The ￿nancial contract
The ￿rms must pay wages before receiving the sales from production. They have to bring in
nominal funds from the previous period in order to do so. This amounts to having the ￿rms
decide the wage bill in advance. Each ￿rm is, thus, restricted to hire and pay wages according
to
WtNi;t ￿ Xi;t￿1, (7)
where Xi;t￿1 are total funds, internal plus external, decided at the assets market in period t￿1,
to be available in period t. The ￿rms have internal funds Zi;t￿1 and borrow Xi;t￿1 ￿ Zi;t￿1.
The loan contract stipulates a payment of Rl
i;t￿1 (Xi;t￿1 ￿ Zi;t￿1), where Rl
i;t￿1 is not con-
tingent on the state at t, when the ￿rm is able to meet those payments, i.e. when !i;t ￿ !i;t,
where !i;t is the minimum productivity level such that the ￿rm is able to pay the ￿xed return
to the bank, so that
PtAt!i;tNi;t = Rl
i;t￿1 (Xi;t￿1 ￿ Zi;t￿1). (8)14
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Otherwise the ￿rm goes bankrupt, and hands out all the production PtAt!i;tNi;t. In this case,
a constant fraction ￿t of the ￿rm￿ s output is destroyed in monitoring, so that the bank gets
(1 ￿ ￿t)PtAt!i;tNi;t.
De￿ne the average share of production accruing to the ￿rms and to the bank, respectively,













Total output is split between the ￿rm, the bank, and monitoring costs
f (!i;t) + g (!i;t;￿t) = 1 ￿ ￿tG(!i;t);
where G(!i;t) =
R !i;t
0 !i;t￿(d!). On average, ￿tG(!i;t) of output is lost in monitoring.





that solves the following problem.
Maximize the expected production accruing to ￿rms, after repaying the debt,
max Et￿1 [f (!i;t)PtAtNi;t]
subject to
WtNi;t ￿ Xi;t￿1 (11)
Et￿1 [g (!i;t;￿t)PtAtNi;t] ￿ Rd
t￿1 (Xi;t￿1 ￿ Zi;t￿1) (12)
Et￿1 [f (!i;t)PtAtNi;t] ￿ Rd
t￿1Zi;t￿1 (13)
where g (!i;t;￿t) and f (!i;t) are given by (9) and (10), respectively, and !i;t is given by (8).6
The informational structure in the economy corresponds to a costly state veri￿cation (CSV)
problem. The optimal contract maximizes the entrepreneur￿ s expected return subject to the
6The problem is written under the assumption that it is optimal to produce, rather than just hold the funds.
The contract also speci￿es what happens if the ￿rm does not produce. If, in case the ￿rm does not produce,
the bank monitors and takes all the funds, then the ￿rm will produce. This is optimal for both the ￿rm and
the bank as long as [1 ￿ ￿tG(!t)]PtAtNi;t ￿ Xi;t￿1. If it is optimal to produce, then the ￿nancial constraint




1￿￿tG(!t). As long as the economy
is su¢ ciently away from the ￿rst best (because the average deposit rate and/or the credit spreads are high
enough), this condition will be satis￿ed.15
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borrowing constraint for ￿rms, (11), the ￿nancial intermediary receiving an amount not lower
on average than the repayment requested by the household (the safe return on deposits), (12),
and the entrepreneur being willing to sign the contract, (13).
The decisions on Xi;t￿1 and Zi;t￿1 are made in period t ￿ 1 at the assets market. We can
replace Ni;t =
Xi;t￿1


































where f (!i;t) and g (!i;t;￿t) are given by (9) and (10), respectively, and where !i;t, de￿ned by











Given that Zi;t￿1 is exogenous to this problem and is predetermined, we can multiply and




!i;t, only. The objective and the constraints of the problem are the same for all ￿rms. The
only ￿rm speci￿c variable would be Zi;t￿1 in the objective, but this would be irrelevant for the
maximization problem. Hence, the solution for
Zi;t￿1
Xi;t￿1, Rl
i;t￿1, and !i;t is the same across ￿rms.
De￿ne zt￿1 ￿
Zi;t￿1
Xi;t￿1 and vt ￿ PtAt
Wt . We can then rewrite !i;t as
!i;t ￿ !t =
Rl
t￿1 (1 ￿ zt￿1)
vt
: (17)
This condition, de￿ning the bankruptcy threshold, together with the ￿rst-order conditions of
the optimal contract problem, which can be written as7








Et￿1 [vtg (!t;￿t)] = Rd







7This is shown in Appendix A.116
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2.3 Entrepreneurs
The assumptions on the entrepreneurs are as in Carlstrom et al. (2009). Entrepreneurs die with
probability ￿t. They have linear preferences over consumption with rate of time preference
￿e. At the time of death, the funds of the entrepreneurs are seized and transferred to the
households. We assume ￿e su¢ ciently high so that the return on internal funds is always
higher than the preference discount, adjusted for the steady state probability of death, 1
￿e(1￿￿).
It follows that the entrepreneurs postpone consumption inde￿nitely. When entrepreneurs die,
or go bankrupt, they are reborn, or restart, with " funds, that can be made arbitrarily small,
transferred to them from the households.
The accumulation of internal funds is given by
Zt = f (!t)PtAtNt ￿ Te
t ; (20)
The tax revenues are
Te
t = ￿tf (!t)PtAtNt: (21)
They are transferred to the households or used for government consumption. The accumulation
of funds can then be written as




In steady state the real assets of the entrepreneurs must be constant. This means that the
net return, after taxes, must be zero. This implies that the coe¢ cient ￿e must be greater than
one, even if, the rate of time preference adjusted for the probability of death is still less than
one, ￿e (1 ￿ ￿) < 1.
2.4 Government





t￿1 + gPtAtNt [1 ￿ ￿tG(!t)] ￿ Tt; (23)
where Tt = Th
t + Te
t , and Ms
t and Ss
t+1 are the supply of money and state contingent assets,
respectively. We assume that government consumption is a share g of production net of the
monitoring costs.17
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2.5 Equilibria
The equilibrium conditions are given by equations (3)-(6), (7) holding with equality, (17), (18),
(19),
Zi;t = ztXi;t; (24)
together with (22), the resource constraints
ct = (1 ￿ g)AtNt [1 ￿ ￿tG(!t)]; (25)
and the remaining market clearing conditions




Dt = Xt ￿ Zt;
Z





Xi;tdi = Xt; and where f (!t) and g (!t;￿t) are given by (9) and (10),
respectively, with !t replacing !it.













We can also use the de￿nition of vt in equation (3), (18) and (19), and combine these last






1 ￿ ￿tG(!t) ￿ f (!t)
Et￿1 [￿t!t￿(!t)]
Et￿1 [1 ￿ ￿(!t)]
￿￿
= Rd
t￿1, t ￿ 1. (27)
The equilibrium conditions are summarized in Appendix A.2, where we also show that,
given a set path for the price level, there is a unique equilibrium for all the other variables.18
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2.6 Optimal policy
We consider optimal Ramsey policy, with commitment. The objective is to maximize the
welfare of the households. The entrepreneurs always consume zero, and therefore their weight
in the welfare function does not matter.8 The assumption of commitment is relevant since the
Ramsey policy is not time consistent. At time zero it is possible to use price level policy to,
once and for all, lower the distortion associated with the costly state veri￿cation (and limited
internal funds). We abstract from the optimal policy at time zero, in accordance with the
timeless perspective in Woodford (2003).
We have assumed that government consumption is a share of production net of monitoring
costs. This assumption has important implications for the optimal average nominal interest
rate. Since a share of resources g are wasted, it is optimal to distort production at a rate that
is approximately equal to g. When g = 0,9 we can show analytically that the Friedman rule is
optimal in steady state, Rd = 1. The Friedman rule is also optimal in response to shocks, in
the calibrated version we analyze below.10
When g > 0, it is optimal to distort the consumption-leisure margin, even if lump-sum
taxes are available. Since the nominal interest rate acts as a consumption tax, it is optimal to
set it higher than zero.11
Setting the path for the nominal interest rate does not pin down equilibrium allocations.
Because the funds are nominal and predetermined, there is still a role for policy. For instance,
in response to a technology shock, the optimal price level policy is aimed at keeping the nominal
wage constant. The price level adjusts so that the real wage moves with productivity. As a
8The alternative approach would be to assume that entrepreneurs also consume and to give them a weight
in the welfare function. The weights would be arbitrary, though, and the results would be much harder to
interpret. They would envolve distribution considerations across the di⁄erent agents, that are not particularly
interesting in this set up. We do not want to think of the entrepreneurs as actual risk neutral agents, that insure
risk averse households, consume and have a weight in the welfare function, but rather as a modelling device to
introduce the external ￿nance premium.
9If the level, and not the share, of government consumption was exogenous, the results would be as in the
case of g = 0.
10This is the case if shocks are small, but not necessarily otherwise.
11This is not a justi￿cation for positive average nominal interest rates, but rather it is a device to allow for
movements in the nominal interest rate. If there were consumption or labor income taxes, the Friedman rule
would again be optimal.19
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result, labor does not move, wages do not move, and therefore nominal predetermined funds
are ex-post optimal.
2.6.1 Optimal steady-state policy
In order to show that, when g = 0, the Friedman rule is optimal in the steady state, we ￿rst
show that steady-state bankruptcy rates are independent of monetary policy.
The following steady state conditions determine Rd, v, z, !, and Rl, for given gross in￿ ation













vg (!) = Rd (1 ￿ z) (30)





Rl (1 ￿ z)
v
: (32)
The ￿rst condition is the Euler equation, (5), in the steady state. The second and third
conditions are the steady state conditions of the contract, (18) and (19). The fourth condition
is the condition for the accumulation of internal funds in the steady state, (22), meaning that
the growth rate of internal funds has to be equal to in￿ ation in order for real internal funds
to remain constant. Finally, the last condition is the de￿nition of the bankruptcy threshold,
(17), in the steady state.
From these conditions, it is clear that higher average in￿ ation in this economy is transmitted
one-to-one to the deposit rate, and also to the lending rate. The mark up, v, increases, also in
the same proportion, because of the intratemporal distortion created by the higher opportunity
cost of funds for the ￿rms. Higher average in￿ ation does not a⁄ect the conditions of the contract
so that the bankruptcy rate and the leverage rate are unchanged. Average in￿ ation is neutral
as far as those ￿nancial variables are concerned.
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that determine ! and z, independently of average in￿ ation, and




that determines c, given ￿. In the log case, an increase in ￿ leaves ! and z unchanged and
lowers consumption and labor in the same proportion.










the condition that ! does not depend on policy, (33), and the resource constraint,
(1 ￿ g)AN [1 ￿ ￿G(!)] = c; (36)
together with the implicit restriction that the nominal interest rate cannot be negative, Rd ￿ 1.
The objective is to maximize steady-state utility u(c) ￿ ￿n, subject to those restrictions.
We consider ￿rst the case where g = 0. For an exogenous !, which by (33) is independent
of policy, suppose we were to maximize utility, subject to the steady-state resource constraint







From (35), this could only be satis￿ed if either ￿ = 0 or ! = 0; and Rd = 1. When credit
frictions are present, and f (!)
￿!￿(!)
1￿￿(!) 6= 0, there is a reason to subsidize consumption, which
in this economy can only be done by reducing the nominal interest rate. Since Rd ￿ 1; it is
optimal to set Rd = 1, as a corner solution. The Friedman rule is optimal.
How can we interpret the optimal subsidy? The subsidy is a second best response to the
restriction on the accumulation of internal funds. If z = 1, there would be no need for external
￿nancing and
! =













Rd = Rl = 121
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would be exactly optimal, and there would be no reason to subsidize. The scarcity of internal
funds is a second best restriction that justi￿es the subsidy to production.
With g su¢ ciently greater than zero it is optimal to tax on average. The same argument






(1 ￿ g)[1 ￿ ￿G(!)]
: (37)
In spite of the reason to subsidize, due to f (!t)
￿!￿(!)
1￿￿(!), if g is high enough, it is optimal to
tax. Then, as we show in the simulations below, it will be optimal to tax at di⁄erent rates, in
response to shocks.
2.6.2 Optimal cyclical policy
When g = 0; in the calibrated version we analyze below, the Friedman rule is optimal also in






1 ￿ ￿tG(!t) ￿ f (!t)
Et￿1 [￿t!t￿(!t)]
Et￿1 [1 ￿ ￿(!t)]
￿￿
= 1. (38)
This condition provides some intuition on what is at stake for optimal policy.
uc(t)At
￿ is the
wedge between the marginal rate of substitution and the marginal rate of transformation if





￿nancial markup present in models with costly state veri￿cation. The wedge has to be equal
to the ￿nancial markup, on average, but not always in response to shocks.
One of the frictions in this economy is the predetermination of funds, which is a nominal
rigidity. If this was the single friction, meaning that ￿t = 0, and the nominal interest rate was







The reason why this equilibrium condition is in expectation is precisely because of the prede-
termination of nominal assets. In this case the goal of policy would be to move the price level
so that the mark up
uc(t)At
￿ would be exactly equal to one. Policy would be able to eliminate
the single friction in the economy, neutralizing the nominal rigidity.12
12We expand on this in Section 4.22
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The nominal rigidity associated with the predetermination of nominal assets can be elim-
inated, as well as the distortion associated with a positive nominal interest rate due to the
restriction that wages must be paid before ￿rms receive production. The ￿nancial friction
associated with the costly state veri￿cation cannot be fully eliminated. This economy is in a
second or third best, where all these frictions interact.13 The ￿nancial distortion would jus-
tify subsidizing production which, given the zero bound on interest rates, is not possible. In
response to shocks, speci￿cally to shocks to technology, it may be optimal to neutralize the
friction due to the predetermination of nominal assets, and to stabilize bankruptcy rates. In
response to ￿nancial shocks, that is no longer the objective of policy.
As the numerical results will show, for logarithmic preferences, the optimal policy in
response to technology shocks is to fully stabilize the ￿nancial markup, therefore keeping
bankruptcy rates constant, and setting the wedge equal to the constant ￿nancial markup.
Given that utility is logarithmic, consumption is proportional to the technology shock, which
implies that labor does not move. From (11), we have that Xt￿1 = PtAt
vt Nt. Since Nt = N,
vt = v, and Xt￿1 does not vary with shocks in t, it must be that the price level is inversely
proportional to the technology shock. Since nominal funds are predetermined and labor does
not move, the optimal policy is to keep the nominal wage constant and adjust the price level
to the movements in the real wage.
3 Numerical results
The model calibration is very standard. We assume utility to be logarithmic in consumption
and linear in leisure. Following Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), we calibrate the volatility of
idiosyncratic productivity shocks and the steady state death probability ￿, so as to generate
an annual steady state credit spread of approximately 2% and a quarterly bankruptcy rate
of approximately 1%.14 The monitoring cost parameter ￿ is set at 0:15 following Levin et al.
(2004).
In the rest of this section, we always focus on adverse shocks, i.e. shocks which tend to
generate a fall in output. Impulse responses under optimal policy refer to an equilibrium in
which policy is described by the ￿rst order conditions of a Ramsey planner deciding allocations
for all times t ￿ 1, but ignoring the special nature of the initial period t = 0. Responses under
13The restriction that government spending is a share of production can also be seen as another distortion.
14The exact values are 1:8% for the annual spread and 1:1% for the bankruptcy rate.23
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a Taylor rule refer to an equilibrium in which policy is set according to the following simple
interest rate rule:
b rd
t = 1:5 ￿ b ￿t (40)
where rd
t ￿ lnRd
t, ￿t ￿ ln(Pt=Pt￿1) and hats denote logarithmic deviations from the non-
stochastic steady state.
In all cases, we only study the log-linear dynamics of the model.
3.1 Impulse responses under optimal policy
Optimal policy in the calibrated version of the model entails setting the nominal interest rate
permanently to zero, as long as g = 0. This restriction is imposed when computing impulse
responses.
3.1.1 Technology shocks
Figure 1 shows the impulse response of selected macroeconomic variables to a negative, 1%
technology shock under optimal policy. The variables are the technology process at ￿ lnAt,
output yt ￿ ln(AtNt), real internal funds zt ￿ ln(Zt￿1=Pt), and in￿ ation ￿t. Bankruptcy
rates, markups, spreads, and leverage are not represented because there is no e⁄ect of the
shock on those under the optimal policy.
It is important to recall that the model includes many features which could potentially
lead to equilibrium allocations that are far from the ￿rst best: asymmetric information and
monitoring costs; the predetermination of ￿nancial decisions; and the nominal denomination
of debt contracts. At the same time, the presence of nominal predetermined contracts implies
that monetary policy is capable of a⁄ecting allocations by choosing appropriate sequences of
prices.
Figure 1 illustrates that optimal policy is able to replicate the ￿rst-best response of con-
sumption and labor allocations to a technology shock.15 In response to the negative technology
shock, since nominal internal and external funds are predetermined, optimal policy generates
in￿ ation for 1 period. As a result, the real value of total funds needed to ￿nance production
falls exactly by the amount necessary to generate the correct reduction in output.
In subsequent periods, the real value of total funds is slowly increased through a mild
reduction in the price level. Along the adjustment path, leverage remains constant and ￿rms
15The allocations are distorted, but the responses are as in the ￿rst best.24
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make no losses. Consumption moves one-to-one with technology, while hours worked remain
constant. With constant labor and an equilibrium nominal wage that stays constant, the
restriction that funds are predetermined is not relevant. The price level adjusts so that the
real wage is always equal to productivity. Since total funds are always at the desired level, the
accumulation equation for nominal funds never kicks in.25
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Figure 1: Impulse responses to a negative technology shock under optimal policy
Note: Logarithmic deviations from the non-stochastic steady state. Cor-
relation of the shock: 0.9.
The impulse responses in Figure 1 would obviously be symmetric after a positive technology
shock. Hence, perfect in￿ ation stabilization ￿i.e. an equilibrium in which in￿ ation is kept
perfectly constant at all points in time ￿is not optimal (we show below that this is the case for
all shocks, not just technology shocks). Allowing for short-term in￿ ation volatility is useful to
help ￿rms adjust their funds, both internal and external, to their production needs. In the case
of technology shocks, this policy also prevents any undesirable ￿ uctuations in the economy￿ s
bankruptcy rate, ￿nancial markup, or the markup resulting from the predetermination of
assets.
This result is robust to a number of perturbations of the model. It also holds if there are
reasons not to keep the nominal interest rate at zero. And it holds in a model where internal
and external funds are perfect substitutes.26
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3.1.2 Financial shocks
We can analyze the impulse responses to three types of ￿nancial shocks. The ￿rst is an increase
in ￿t, namely a shock which generates an exogenous reduction in the level of internal funds.
The second one is a shock to the standard deviation of idiosyncratic technology shocks, ￿!i;t,
which amounts to an increase in the uncertainty of the economic environment. The third shock
is an increase in the monitoring cost parameter ￿t. In the text, we focus on the ￿rst shock.
The other two shocks are analyzed in Appendix 3.
Contrary to the case of Figure 1, bankruptcy rates, markups, spreads, and leverage are not
constant after ￿nancial shocks. In all these cases, therefore, we also report impulse responses
of: zt ￿ ln(Zt=Xt); (log-)consumption, ct; the share of ￿rms that go bankrupt, ￿(!t); the







The impulse responses to ￿t in Figure 2 are interesting because they generate at the same
time a reduction in output and an increase in leverage. Leverage can be de￿ned as the ratio
of external to internal funds used in production, i.e. as 1=zt ￿ 1 and it is therefore negatively
related to zt. To highlight the di⁄erent persistence of the e⁄ects of the shock, depending on
the prevailing policy rule, we focus on a serially uncorrelated shock.
The higher ￿ does not have an e⁄ect on funds on impact because of the predetermination of
￿nancing decisions, but it represents a fall in internal funds at t+1, which leads to an increase
in ￿rms￿leverage.27
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Figure 2: Impulse responses to a fall in the value of internal funds under optimal policy
Note: Logarithmic deviations from the non-stochastic steady state. Serially
uncorrelated shock.
We will see below that under a Taylor rule this shock brings about a period of de￿ ation,
which would be quite persistent if the original shock were also persistent. The optimal policy
response, instead, is to create a short-lived period of in￿ ation. The impact increase in the
price level lowers the real value of total funds, so as to decrease labor and production levels.
Mark ups increase on impact, as output and consumption decrease, so that the future cut in
internal funds can be partially o⁄set. The higher pro￿ts allow ￿rms to quickly start rebuilding
their internal funds. The adjustment process is essentially complete after 3 years. When
consumption starts growing towards the steady state, the real rate must increase. For given
nominal interest rate, there must be a period of mild de￿ ation.
3.2 Optimal policy when a non-zero interest rate is optimal
In this section, we explore to which extent the optimal policy recommendations described
above are a⁄ected by the fact that the nominal interest rate is kept constant at zero. In28
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the calibration, we keep all other parameters unchanged, but we assume that there is a ￿xed
share of government consumption g > 0. As discussed above, the optimal steady state level
of the nominal interest rate increases proportionately. We therefore calibrate the government
consumption share to generate a reasonably small steady state value of the nominal interest
rate, namely g = 0:02.16
3.2.1 Technology shocks
In spite of the availability of the nominal interest rate as a policy instrument, the optimal
response to a technology shock is the same as before. Policy replicates the response of the
allocations which would be attained in a frictionless model, whether nominal interest rates can
be moved or not. This result is striking, because it implies that, in reaction to technology
shocks, the zero bound on nominal interest rates does not represent a constraint for monetary
policy in our model.
The result, however, holds solely in reaction to technology shocks. As discussed next, the
zero bound does represent a constraint for monetary policy in response to ￿nancial shocks.
3.2.2 Financial shocks
For all ￿nancial shocks, the ￿ exibility of using the nominal interest rate allows policy to speed
up the adjustment after ￿nancial shocks. The e⁄ect of these shocks on output is considerably
mitigated. We illustrate this general result with a serially uncorrelated shock to ￿.
The impulse responses to this shock under the optimal policy are shown in Figure 3, together
with the impulse responses in the case where the Friedman rule is optimal. The most striking
result is that the impact of this shock on output, which is persistently contractionary when
the short term nominal rate is kept ￿xed at zero, is less contractionary and very short-lived
when the interest rate can be reduced.
The reduction in policy rates improves credit conditions directly, because it also reduces
loan rates ￿ the increase in the credit spread is largely comparable to the case when the
Friedman rule is optimal. After decreasing on impact, output can immediately return to
the steady state, while consumption has to adjust at a lower pace because of the increase
in aggregate monitoring costs. The mildly positive rate of growth of consumption along the
16Compared to the g = 0 case, there is an increase in the steady state level of the credit spread, to 1.27%,
and of the bankruptcy rate, to 6.7%.29
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adjustment path implies that the real interest rate must also be positive. Given the protracted
fall in the policy interest rate, in￿ ation must also fall persistently ￿and by slightly more than
the nominal interest rate ￿after its impact increase.
Figure 3: Impulse responses to a fall in the value of internal assets under optimal policy
Note: Logarithmic deviations from the non-stochastic steady state. Uncorre-
lated shock. The lines with circles indicate impulse responses under optimal
policy when g > 0; the solid lines report impulse responses under optimal policy
already shown in Figure 2.
The impact e⁄ect of the shock on mark-ups is comparable to the case in which the Friedman
rule is optimal, but the adjustment process is much faster.
3.3 Taylor rule policy
We now compare the impulse responses under optimal policy and g > 0 with those in which
policy follows the simple Taylor rule in equation (40).30
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3.3.1 Technology shocks and the cyclicality of bankruptcies
In response to a negative technology shock, the simple Taylor rule tries to stabilize in￿ ation
(see Figure 4). The large amount of nominal funds that ￿rms carry over from the previous
period, therefore, has high real value. Given the available funds, ￿rms hire more labor and
the output contraction is relatively small, compared to what would be optimal at the new
productivity level. As a result, the wage share increases and ￿rms make lower pro￿ts, hence
they must sharply reduce their internal funds. Leverage goes up, and so do the credit spread
and the bankruptcy rate. In the period after the shock, ￿rms start accumulating funds again,
but accumulation is slow and output keeps falling for a whole year after the shock. It is only
in the second year after the shock that the recovery begins.
Figure 4 illustrates how our model is able to generate realistic, cyclical properties for the
credit spread and the bankruptcy ratio. An increase in bankruptcies is almost a de￿nition of
recession in the general perception, while the fact that credit spreads are higher during NBER
recession dates is documented, for example, in Levin et al. (2004). Generating the correct
cyclical relationship between credit spreads, bankruptcies and output is not straightforward
in models with ￿nancial frictions. For example, spreads are unrealistically procyclical in the
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997, 2000) framework. The reason is that ￿rms￿￿nancing decisions are
state contingent in those papers. Firms can choose how much to borrow from the banks after
observing aggregate shocks. Should a negative technology shock occur, they would immediately
borrow less and try to cut production. This would avoid large drops in their pro￿ts and internal
funds, so that their leverage would not increase. As a result, bankruptcy rates and credit
spreads could remain constant or decrease during the recession.
In our model, economic outcomes are reversed because of the pre-determination in ￿nancial
decisions. Firms￿loans are no-longer state contingent, hence they cannot be changed after ob-
serving aggregate shocks. This assumption implies that ￿rms are constrained in their impact
response to disturbances. After a negative technology shock, ￿rms ￿nd themselves with exces-
sive funds and their pro￿ts fall because production levels do not fall enough. The reverse would
happen during an expansionary shock, when production would initially increase too little and
pro￿ts would be high.31
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Note: Logarithmic deviations from the non-stochastic steady state. Correlation
of the shock: 0.9. The lines with crosses indicate impulse responses under the
Taylor rule; the lines with circles report the impulse responses under optimal
policy already shown in Figure 1.
The model also generates a realistically hump-shaped impulse response of output and con-
sumption without the need for additional assumptions, such as habit persistence in households￿
preferences. Once a shock creates the need for changes in internal funds, these changes can
only take place slowly. Compared to the habit persistence assumption, our model implies that
the hump-shape in impulse responses is policy-dependent. After a technology shock, optimal
policy keeps internal funds at their optimal level at any point in time. Firms do not need
to accumulate, or decumulate, internal funds, and, as a result, the hump in the response of
output and consumption disappears.
A notable feature of Figure 4 is that the Taylor rule generates the "wrong" reaction of prices
to the negative technology shock compared to optimal policy ￿a small de￿ ation on impact,
rather than in￿ ation. The reason is related to the hump-shaped response of consumption,
which implies that the real interest rate must fall for a few quarters after the shock. If in￿ ation
Figure 4: Impulse responses to a negative technology shock under a Taylor rule32
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increased on impact, the policy rate would have to increase by less than in￿ ation in order to
bring about a negative real interest rate. However, this policy response would be inconsistent
with the rule in equation (40), which requires the interest rate to increase more than in￿ ation.
The fall in the real interest rate must therefore be implemented through a reduction in the
nominal interest rate and a period of de￿ ation.
This result is independent of the size of the in￿ ation response coe¢ cient in the Taylor rule
￿provided that the rule is consistent with a determinate equilibrium. If the in￿ ation response
coe¢ cient were higher (lower), de￿ ation would simply be smaller (larger). Only in the limiting
case of a very large response coe¢ cient would the outcome be not de￿ ation, but a situation
very close to price stability.
An implication of this result is that, after a technology shock, the higher the in￿ ation
response coe¢ cient in the Taylor rule, the closer is the Taylor rule to optimal policy. Intu-
itively, price stability is closer to the in￿ ationary outcome produced by optimal policy than
the de￿ ation rate generated by the Taylor rule. This property of the Taylor rule in our model
is reminiscent of the results in Gilchrist and Leahy (2002) and Faia and Monacelli (2007),
where a Taylor rule with a high in￿ ation response coe¢ cient delivers superior outcomes. The
overall properties of the Taylor rule, however, are very di⁄erent. Gilchrist and Leahy (2002)
and Faia and Monacelli (2007) also assume sticky prices, and price stability is optimal in that
environment. In our model, allocations under price stability would remain far away from the
optimum. After a negative technology shock, the real level of funds would still be too high, so
that production and consumption would come down in a hump-shape manner, rather than on
impact as they should.
3.3.2 Shocks to the value of internal assets
A reduction in the value of internal assets leads to an increase in leverage, the economy￿ s
bankruptcy rate and credit spreads (see Figure 5). As in the case of optimal policy (when
g > 0), the Taylor rule prescribes a fall in the policy interest rate. For similar reasons to those
applying in the case of technology shocks, however, the Taylor rule brings about de￿ ation,
rather than in￿ ation. De￿ ation keeps output too high on impact and generates a fall in mark-
ups. As a result, the impact increase in leverage is more pronounced than under optimal policy.
Consequently, the de-leveraging process is very slow and consumption is still away from the
steady state three years after the shock. Compared to the optimal policy case, the recession33
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is more persistent and it comes at the cost of a higher bankruptcy rate and a higher credit
spread.
Figure 5: Impulse responses to a fall in the value of internal assets under a Taylor rule
Note: Logarithmic deviations from the non-stochastic steady state. The shock
is serially uncorrelated. The lines with crosses indicate impulse responses un-
der the Taylor rule; the lines with circles report the impulse responses under
optimal policy already shown in Figure 3.
Under a Taylor rule, this shock leads to a situation akin to the "initial state of over-
indebtedness" described in Fisher (1933), in which ￿rms￿leverage increase and de￿ ation ensues.
In Fisher￿ s theory, ￿rms try to de-leverage through a fast debt liquidation and the selling tends
to drive down prices. If monetary policy accommodates this trend, the price level also falls and
the real value of ￿rms liabilities increase further, leading to even higher leverage and further
selling. In our model, over-indebtedness and leverage are also exacerbated by de￿ ation, but
the mechanics of the model are di⁄erent. De-leveraging occurs through an accumulation of
assets, rather than a liquidation of debt.34
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3.3.3 Policy shocks
Figure 6 shows the impulse responses to a serially correlated shock to the Taylor rule, corre-
sponding to an increase in the policy rate.
The shock is useful to illustrate the general features of the monetary policy transmission
mechanism in this model. These are characterized by the slow accumulation of internal funds,
which produces very persistent responses in all variables.
Figure 6: Impulse responses to a monetary policy shock
Note: Logarithmic deviations from the non-stochastic steady state. Correlation
of the shock: 0.9.
The shock generates an immediate increase in the price level which reduces the real value
of ￿rms￿nominal funds and induces a contraction in production and consumption through a
fall in employment and real wages. Since leverage is predetermined in the ￿rst period, the
lower production level brings about a reduction in the bankruptcy rate. Pro￿ts increase and,
after one period, ￿rms ￿nd themselves with an excess of internal funds. They therefore start35
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decumulating them, but the adjustment process is very slow. Three years after the shock,
output, consumption and employment are still far away from the steady state.
4 The case in which internal and external funds are perfect
substitutes
In order to better understand the results of the general model, we analyze a simpli￿ed case in
which assets are predetermined, but internal and external funds are perfect substitutes - i.e.
monitoring costs are zero.
Even in the absence of costly state veri￿cation, it is not optimal to stabilize in￿ ation at
all times. Hence, the predetermination of assets and the nominal denomination of funds are
responsible for the deviation from price stability under the optimal policy in the general model.
We also use this model to evaluate the role played by asymmetric information and monitor-
ing costs in explaining business cycle ￿ uctuations. We ￿nd that, although these imperfections
play a quantitatively minor role in determining the cyclical behavior of non-￿nancial variables,
they tend to amplify the reaction of the economy to shocks.
4.1 In￿ ation stabilization is not optimal
We consider the case where g > 0, and the nominal interest rate is high enough that the
borrowing constraint of ￿rms is always binding. In the model with ￿nancial frictions this was
not necessary since positive ￿nancial markups guaranteed that the constraint was binding.
The equilibrium conditions in this economy are given by (3)-(6), together with
Rl
t￿1 = Rd
t￿1 ￿ Rt￿1, t ￿ 1 (41)








, t ￿ 0 (43)
ct = (1 ￿ g)AtNt, t ￿ 0: (44)
where Rt is the policy rate.36
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1123
December 2009






= Rt￿1, t ￿ 1 (45)
ct = (1 ￿ g)AtNt, t ￿ 0 (46)
Every equilibrium sequence for ct, Nt, t ￿ 0, and Rt￿1, t ￿ 1, in this set can be implemented.
The other equilibrium conditions are satis￿ed by the choice of the remaining variables: (41)
determine Rl
t￿1 and Rd
t￿1, t ￿ 1. For t = 0, given a value X￿1 and an allocation c0 and N0,
(42) and (3) are satis￿ed by the choice of W0 and P0. For t ￿ 1, given an allocation ct and Nt,
and Rt￿1, conditions (3), (5) and (42) are satis￿ed by the choice of Wt, Pt and Xt￿1. There are
two contemporaneous conditions and one predetermined condition for two contemporaneous
variables and one predetermined variable. (43) determines vt; (4) determines Q￿1
t￿1;t, and (6)
restricts mt.
The restriction that government consumption is a constant share of production is a second-
best restriction in this environment, implying the optimal use of proportionate taxation, even if
lump-sum taxation is available. The optimal, second-best, allocation maximizes utility subject
to the resource constraints







, t ￿ 0: (47)
This optimal allocation can be implemented in this economy with predetermined assets, since




, t ￿ 1:
In this economy, monetary policy does much more than just setting the interest rate.
Implementing the optimal allocation, requires moving the price level to adjust the real value
of funds.
Under log-linear preferences, labor would not move in response to shocks to productivity,
At. Since funds are predetermined, in (42), the wage rate could not move either and, from
(3), the price level would have to be inversely proportional to consumption, or to the shocks
to productivity.37
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4.2 The role of asymmetric information and monitoring costs
Figure 7 compares the reaction to a technology shock under the Taylor rule in the general
model of section 2 and in the model of this section. The ￿gure shows that the di⁄erences
between the two cases are not overwhelming, but the model with asymmetric information and
monitoring costs tends to amplify business cycle ￿ uctuations in response to shocks. Compared
to the simpler model, the recession induced by a negative technology shock is deeper when
accompanied by an increase in credit spreads and in the bankruptcy rate. Employment ￿ uctu-
ations are also more pronounced and so is the volatility of in￿ ation and of the policy interest
rate.38
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Figure 7: Impulse responses to a negative techology shock under a Taylor rule
Note: Logarithmic deviations from the non-stochastic steady state. Correlation
of the shock: 0.9. The dashed lines report the impulse responses in the case
where internal and external funds are perfect substitutes; the lines with crosses
corresponds to those in Figure 4.
5 Conclusions
The model described in this paper represents an attempt to clarify the policy incentives created
by the nominal denomination of ￿rms￿debt. Our analysis is based on a number of simplifying
assumptions and does not aim to provide quantitative policy prescriptions. Nevertheless, we
highlight results that may be of relevance also in more general frameworks.
The ￿rst result is that maintaining price stability at all times is not optimal when ￿rms ￿-
nancial positions are denominated in nominal terms and debt contracts are not state-contingent.
After a negative technology shock, for example, an impact increase in the price level stabilizes
￿rms￿leverage and allows for a more e¢ cient economic response to the shock. This ability of39
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monetary policy to in￿ uence the real value of ￿rms￿assets and liabilities derives from the as-
sumption that, when shocks occur, ￿nancial contracts are predetermined. The policy response
through the price level is such that, in response to technology shocks, there is no need for the
central bank to adjust the nominal interest rate.
A second result is that the optimal response to an exogenous reduction in internal funds,
which amounts to an increase in ￿rms￿leverage, is to reduce the nominal interest rate, if the
nominal rate is not at its zero bound, and to engineer a short period of controlled in￿ ation.
Both policy responses have the advantages of mitigating the adverse consequences of the shock
on bankruptcy rates and of allowing ￿rms to quickly de-leverage.
Finally, we show that a simple Taylor-type rule would produce signi￿cantly di⁄erent eco-
nomic outcomes from those prevailing if policy is set optimally. For example, under a Taylor
rule bankruptcy rates would increase during recessions, as it appears to be the case in the
empirical evidence. Bankruptcy rates would instead be acyclical under optimal policy.
A Appendix
A.1 The ￿nancial contract
Consider the optimal ￿nancial contract problem that maximizes (14) subject to (15) and (16),


























t￿1 (1 ￿ zt￿1)
vt
: (48)




































where the functions f (!i;t) and g (!i;t;￿t) are given by (9) and (10), respectively.40
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De￿ne as ￿1;t￿1 and ￿2;t￿1 the Lagrangean multipliers of (49) and (50) respectively. Con-





























































t￿1 (1 ￿ zt￿1)
where fj and gj, with j = 1;2, are the derivatives of f and g with respect to the ￿rst and




























































t￿1 (1 ￿ zt￿1):
From the second condition, since zt￿1 < 1 and ￿1t￿1 > 0,
Rl




























which veri￿es the conjecture that ￿2t￿1 = 0.
Using the de￿nition of the threshold, (48), the ￿rst-order conditions can be written as (18)
and (19).
A.2 Equilibria







z￿1; X￿1, Z￿1 = z￿1X￿1, and Rl






; t ￿ 0 (51)41
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; t ￿ 1 (52)






zt￿1; t ￿ 1 (53)
Et￿1 [vtg (!t;￿t)] = Rd
t￿1 (1 ￿ zt￿1); t ￿ 1 (54)
!t =
Rl
t￿1 (1 ￿ zt￿1)
vt




; t ￿ 0 (56)








Zt￿2; t ￿ 1 (58)
(1 ￿ g)AtNt [1 ￿ ￿tG(!t)] = ct; t ￿ 0 (59)
The other equilibrium conditions determine the remaining variables.
Given the path for the price level there is a unique equilibrium for the other variables. To
see this, notice that at t = 0, given the values of z￿1; X￿1 and Rl
￿1; the equilibrium for c0, N0,
v0, !0, can be determined using (51), (55), (56), and (59), for t = 0. Given these variables,
Z￿1 = z￿1X￿1, and the path for the price level, Pt, the remaining variables ct, Nt, vt, !t,
Zt￿1, Rd
t￿1, zt￿1, Rl
t￿1, Xt￿1 for t ￿ 1, are determined using (51)-(59), for t ￿ 1. These are
4 contemporaneous variables and 5 predetermined variables, restricted by 4 contemporaneous
conditions and 5 predetermined conditions. If Pt are set exogenously, all the other variables
have a single solution. Alternatively, we could set exogenously Rd
t￿1, plus Pt in as many states
as #St ￿ #St￿1, and again there would be a unique equilibrium.
A.3 Impulse responses to ￿nancial shocks
We present here additional impulse responses to ￿nancial shocks in the baseline model where
the Friedman rule is optimal. Shocks are serially correlated with a 0:9 correlation coe¢ cient.
In all cases, we compare the impulse responses under the optimal policy to those arising under
the Taylor rule.42
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Figure A1: Impulse responses to an increase in ￿!t
Note: Logarithmic deviations from the non-stochastic steady state. Correlation
of the shock: 0.9. The lines with crosses indicate impulse responses under the
Taylor rule; the lines with circles report the impulse responses under optimal
policy (in the g > 0 case).
Figure A1 shows the impulse responses to a persistent increase in the riskiness of the
economy, i.e. to an increase in the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shocks ￿!i;t. This
shock is associated with a prospective worsening of credit conditions and an increase in the
bankruptcy rate.
As in the case of the negative shock to the value of internal assets (the ￿t shock), optimal
monetary policy (the line with circles) engineers on impact an increase in the price level to
reduce output. The ￿nancing conditions stipulated before the shock are ex-post favorable to
￿rms: on impact, the output contraction enables them to make higher pro￿ts, so that they will
accumulate more internal funds in the following period. This increase in internal funds allows
for a fast economic recovery, because a contemporaneous fall in the policy rate neutralizes the
e⁄ects of the increase in credit spreads.43
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The impulse responses to this shock are qualitatively similar to those to a shock in the value
of ￿rms￿internal assets. The main exception is the response of leverage, which falls after a ￿!i;t
shock and increases after a ￿t shock. The reduction of leverage observed in Figure A1 under
optimal policy is a direct result of the impact increase in ￿rms￿pro￿ts. This is consistent with
the temporary increase in the volatility of idiosyncratic shocks at almost unchanged (except
on impact) consumption and hours worked. Even if the shock is serially correlated, output
and consumption are back at the steady state after one quarter.
Figure A2: Impulse responses to an increase in ￿t
Note: Logarithmic deviations from the non-stochastic steady state. Correlation
of the shock: 0.9. The lines with crosses indicate impulse responses under the
Taylor rule; the lines with circles report the impulse responses under optimal
policy (in the g > 0 case).
Under the Taylor rule (the line with crosses), there is also a sharp decrease in the deposit
rate but, contrary to the optimal policy case, the price level falls on impact. This prevents the
initial contraction of output and consumption. As a result, leverage, bankruptcy rates, and44
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spreads are higher than under the optimal policy. Internal funds are accumulated at a slower
pace and the recession is longer lasting.
Figure A2 plots the responses to an exogenous increase in the proportion of total funds
lost in monitoring activities, ￿t. This is di⁄erent from the shock previously analyzed because
it mechanically implies a higher waste of resources per unit of output. The optimal policy
response is to reduce output in order to minimize the resource loss. If the shock was not
serially correlated, this would once again be achieved through an impact increase in the price
level. Since the shock is persistent, however, policy needs to manage a trade-o⁄ between
immediate and future resource losses. An impact increase in the price level would not only
immediately reduce output, but it would also lead to more pro￿ts and a faster accumulation
of internal funds, hence large future losses in monitoring activity as long as ￿t remains high.
Compared to this scenario, future losses would be minimized if the price level were instead cut
on impact, so as to slow down the accumulation of internal funds.
The trade-o⁄ between minimizing current and future losses leads to an impact fall in the
price level under optimal policy. This increases the real value of ￿rms￿funds and, in turn,
allows ￿rms to expand production. The ensuing increases in credit spreads and in bankruptcy
rates are countered by a contemporaneous fall in the policy rate. As in the case of the other
￿nancial shocks, optimal policy ensures a fast adjustment process: after one quarter, output
and hours are back in steady state, and ￿ uctuations in consumption and mark-ups become
negligible.
In reaction to a shock to ￿t, the price level and the policy interest rate fall less under the
Taylor rule. As in the case of other ￿nancial shocks, this reaction leads to a more protracted
contraction in both output and consumption.
References
[1] Bernanke, B.S., Gertler, M. and S. Gilchrist. ￿The Financial Accelerator in a Quantitative
Business Cycle Framework.￿In: Taylor, John B. and Woodford, Michael, eds. Handbook
of macroeconomics. Volume 1C. Handbooks in Economics, vol. 15. Amsterdam; New York
and Oxford: Elsevier Science, North-Holland, 1999, pp. 1341-93.
[2] Carlstrom, C.T., and T. Fuerst. ￿Agency Costs, Net Worth, ad Business Fluctuations: A
Computable General Equilibrium Analysis.￿American Economic Review, 1997, 87, pp.45
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1123
December 2009
893-910.
[3] Carlstrom, C.T., and T. Fuerst. ￿Agency Costs and Business Cycles.￿Economic Theory,
1998, 12, pp. 583-597.
[4] Carlstrom, C.T., and T. Fuerst. ￿Monetary Shocks, Agency Costs and Business Cycles.￿
Carnegie-Rochester Series on Public Policy, 2001, 51, pp. 1-27.
[5] Carlstrom, C.T., T. Fuerst and M. Paustian. ￿Optimal Monetary Policy in a Model with
Agency Costs.￿Mimeo, 2009.
[6] Christiano, L., R. Motto and M. Rostagno (2003). ￿The Great Depression and the
Friedman-Schwartz Hypothesis.￿Journal of Money Credit and Banking 35(6), pp. 1119-
1197.
[7] Curdia, V. and M. Woodford (2009). ￿Credit Frictions and Optimal Monetary Policy.￿
Mimeo, FRB New York.
[8] De Fiore, F. and O. Tristani (2008). ￿Optimal Monetary Policy in a Model of the Credit
Channel.￿Mimeo, European Central Bank.
[9] Faia, E (2008). ￿Optimal Monetary Policy with Credit Augmented Liquidity Cycles.￿
Mimeo, Goethe University Frankfurt.
[10] Faia, E. and T. Monacelli. ￿Optimal Monetary Policy Rules, Asset Prices and Credit
Frictions.￿Journal of Economic, Dynamics and Control 31, 10, 2007, pp. 3228-3254.
[11] Fisher, I. . ￿The debt-de￿ ation theory of great depressions.￿Econometrica I, 1933, pp.
337-357.
[12] Gilchrist, S. and J. Leahy. ￿Monetary Policy and Asset Prices.￿ Journal of Monetary
Economics 49, 2002, pp. 75-97.
[13] Levin, A.T., Natalucci, F., and E. Zakrajsek. ￿The Magnitude and Cyclical Behavior of
Financial Market Frictions.￿Sta⁄WP 2004-70, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, 2004.
[14] Ravenna, F. and C. Walsh. ￿Optimal Monetary Policy with the Cost Channel.￿Journal
of Monetary Economics, 53, 2006, pp.199-216.46
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1123
December 2009
[15] Svensson, L. ￿Money and Asset Prices in a Cash-in-Advance Economy.￿Journal of Po-
litical Economy 93, 1985, pp. 919-944. Reprinted in Kevin D. Hoover, ed., The Economic
Legacy of Robert Lucas, Jr, Edward Elgar, 1999.
[16] Woodford, M (2003). ￿Interest and Prices.￿Princeton University Press.47
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1123
December 2009
European Central Bank Working Paper Series
For a complete list of Working Papers published by the ECB, please visit the ECB’s website 
(http://www.ecb.europa.eu).
1086 “Euro area money demand: empirical evidence on the role of equity and labour markets” by G. J. de Bondt, 
September 2009.
1087 “Modelling global trade flows: results from a GVAR model” by M. Bussière, A. Chudik and G. Sestieri, 
September 2009.
1088 “Inflation perceptions and expectations in the euro area: the role of news” by C. Badarinza and M. Buchmann, 
September 2009. 
1089 “The effects of monetary policy on unemployment dynamics under model uncertainty: evidence from the US 
and the euro area” by C. Altavilla and M. Ciccarelli, September 2009.
1090 “New Keynesian versus old Keynesian government spending multipliers” by J. F. Cogan, T. Cwik, J. B. Taylor 
and V. Wieland, September 2009.
1091 “Money talks” by M. Hoerova, C. Monnet and T. Temzelides, September 2009.
1092 “Inflation and output volatility under asymmetric incomplete information” by G. Carboni and M. Ellison, 
September 2009.
1093 “Determinants of government bond spreads in new EU countries” by I. Alexopoulou, I. Bunda and A. Ferrando, 
September 2009.
1094 “Signals from housing and lending booms” by I. Bunda and M. Ca’Zorzi, September 2009.
1095 “Memories of high inflation” by M. Ehrmann and P. Tzamourani, September 2009.
1096 “The determinants of bank capital structure” by R. Gropp and F. Heider, September 2009.
1097 “Monetary and fiscal policy aspects of indirect tax changes in a monetary union” by A. Lipińska 
and L. von Thadden, October 2009.
1098 “Gauging the effectiveness of quantitative forward guidance: evidence from three inflation targeters” 
by M. Andersson and B. Hofmann, October 2009.
1099 “Public and private sector wages interactions in a general equilibrium model” by G. Fernàndez de Córdoba, 
J.J. Pérez and J. L. Torres, October 2009.
1100 “Weak and strong cross section dependence and estimation of large panels” by A. Chudik, M. Hashem Pesaran 
and E. Tosetti, October 2009.
1101 “Fiscal variables and bond spreads – evidence from eastern European countries and Turkey” by C. Nickel, 
P. C. Rother and J. C. Rülke, October 2009.
1102 “Wage-setting behaviour in France: additional evidence from an ad-hoc survey” by J. Montornés and 
J.-B. Sauner-Leroy, October 2009.
1103 “Inter-industry wage differentials: how much does rent sharing matter?” by P. Du Caju, F. Rycx and I. Tojerow, 
October 2009.48
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1123
December 2009
1104 “Pass-through of external shocks along the pricing chain: a panel estimation approach for the euro area” 
by B. Landau and F. Skudelny, November 2009.
1105 “Downward nominal and real wage rigidity: survey evidence from European firms” by J. Babecký, P. Du Caju, 
T. Kosma, M. Lawless, J. Messina and T. Rõõm, November 2009.
1106 “The margins of labour cost adjustment: survey evidence from European firms” by J. Babecký, P. Du Caju, 
T. Kosma, M. Lawless, J. Messina and T. Rõõm, November 2009.
1107 “Interbank lending, credit risk premia and collateral” by F. Heider and M. Hoerova, November 2009.
1108 “The role of financial variables in predicting economic activity” by R. Espinoza, F. Fornari and M. J. Lombardi, 
November 2009.
1109 “What triggers prolonged inflation regimes? A historical analysis.” by I. Vansteenkiste, November 2009.
1110 “Putting the New Keynesian DSGE model to the real-time forecasting test” by M. Kolasa, M. Rubaszek 
and P. Skrzypczyński, November 2009.
1111 “A stable model for euro area money demand: revisiting the role of wealth” by A. Beyer, November 2009.
1112 “Risk spillover among hedge funds: the role of redemptions and fund failures” by B. Klaus and B. Rzepkowski, 
November 2009.
1113 “Volatility spillovers and contagion from mature to emerging stock markets” by J. Beirne, G. M. Caporale, 
M. Schulze-Ghattas and N. Spagnolo, November 2009.
1114 “Explaining government revenue windfalls and shortfalls: an analysis for selected EU countries” by R. Morris, 
C. Rodrigues Braz, F. de Castro, S. Jonk, J. Kremer, S. Linehan, M. Rosaria Marino, C. Schalck and O. Tkacevs.
1115 “Estimation and forecasting in large datasets with conditionally heteroskedastic dynamic common factors” 
by L. Alessi, M. Barigozzi and M. Capasso, November 2009.
1116 “Sectorial border effects in the European single market: an explanation through industrial concentration” 
by G. Cafiso, November 2009.
1117 “What drives personal consumption? The role of housing and financial wealth” by J. Slacalek, November 2009.
1118 “Discretionary fiscal policies over the cycle: new evidence based on the ESCB disaggregated approach” 
by L. Agnello and J. Cimadomo, November 2009.
1119 “Nonparametric hybrid Phillips curves based on subjective expectations: estimates for the euro area” 
by M. Buchmann, December 2009.
1120 “Exchange rate pass-through in central and eastern European member states” by J. Beirne and M. Bijsterbosch, 
December 2009.
1121 “Does finance bolster superstar companies? Banks, venture capital and firm size in local U.S. markets” 
by A. Popov, December 2009.
1122 “Monetary policy shocks and portfolio choice” by M. Fratzscher, C. Saborowski and R. Straub, December 2009.
1123 “Monetary policy and the financing of firms” by F. De Fiore, P. Teles and O. Tristani, December 2009.Working PaPer SerieS
no 1118 / november 2009
DiScretionary  
FiScal PolicieS  
over the cycle
neW eviDence  
baSeD on the eScb 
DiSaggregateD aPProach
by Luca Agnello  
and Jacopo Cimadomo